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Income Tax Act, 1961 – ss. 147 and 148 – Reopening of a concluded assessment-reassessment u/s. 147 following issuance of notice u/s. 148 – Sustainability:

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 642 : 2024 INSC 53

M/s Mangalam Publications, Kottayam

v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

(Civil Appeal Nos. 8580-8582 of 2011)

23 January 2024

[B. V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Reopening of a concluded assessment-reassessment u/s. 147 of

the Income Tax Act, 1961 following issuance of notice u/s. 148 of

the Act, legally sustainable or bad in law.

Headnotes

Income Tax Act, 1961 – ss. 147 and 148 – Reopening of a

concluded assessment-reassessment u/s. 147 following

issuance of notice u/s. 148 – Sustainability:

Held: On the basis of the balance sheet submitted by the

assessee before the Bank for obtaining credit, the assessing

officer upon a comparison of the same with a subsequent balance

sheet filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1993-94

concluded that there was escapement of income and initiated

reassessment proceedings – Dehors such balance sheet, there

were no other material in the possession of the assessing officer

to hold that income of the assessee for the assessment years

had escaped assessment – When the assessee had not made

any false declaration, it was nothing but a subsequent subjective

analysis of the assessing officer that income of the assessee for

the assessment years was much higher than what was assessed

and thus, had escaped assessment – This was a mere change

of opinion which cannot be a ground for reopening of assessment

– Returns for the assessment years were not accompanied by

the regular books of account – Such return may be a defective

one but certainly not invalid return – Furthermore, in none of the

assessment years, the assessing officer had issued any declaration

that the returns were defective – Assessee asserted both in the

pleadings and in the oral hearing that though it could not file regular

books of account along with the returns for the assessment years

because of seizure by the department, nonetheless the returns 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 643

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

of income were accompanied by tentative profit and loss account

and other details of income which were duly enquired into by the

assessing officer in the assessment proceedings – Thus, the tribunal

justified in holding that the reassessments for the assessment

years not justified – High Court erred in reversing the findings of

the tribunal – Order of the High Court set aside and that of the

tribunal restored. [Paras 41-45]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 147 – Income escaping assessment

– ‘Full and true disclosure’ – Meaning of:

Held: Word ‘disclosure’ means to disclose, reveal, unravel or

bring to notice –Word ‘true’ qualifies a fact or averment as correct,

exact, actual, genuine or honest – Word ‘full’ means complete –

True disclosure of concealed income must relate to the assessee

concerned – Full disclosure, in the context of financial documents,

means that all material or significant information should be disclosed

– Thus, the meaning of ‘full and true disclosure’ is the voluntary

filing of a return of income that the assessee earnestly believes

to be true – Production of books of accounts or other material

evidence that could ordinarily be discovered by the assessing

officer does not amount to a true and full disclosure. [Para 31]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 147 – Income escaping assessment

– Expression “change of opinion” in terms of assessment

proceedings:

Held: Expression “change of opinion” would imply formulation

of opinion and then a change thereof – In terms of assessment

proceedings, it means formulation of belief by the assessing officer

resulting from what he thinks on a particular question – Thus, before

interfering with the proposed reopening of the assessment on the

ground that the same is based only on a change of opinion, the

court ought to verify whether the assessment earlier made has either

expressly or by necessary implication expressed an opinion on a

matter which is the basis of the alleged escapement of income that

was taxable – If the assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or

perfunctory in nature, it may be difficult to attribute to the assessing

officer any opinion on the questions that are raised in the proposed

reassessment proceedings. [Para 36]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 139 – Return of income – Obligation

on assessee to disclose all material facts necessary for his

assessment:

644 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Held: s.139 places an obligation upon every person to furnish

voluntarily a return of his total income if such income during

the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not

chargeable to income tax – Assessee is under further obligation

to disclose all material facts necessary for his assessment for

that year fully and truly – While the duty of the assessee is to

disclose fully and truly all primary and relevant facts necessary for

assessment, it does not extend beyond this – Once the primary

facts are disclosed by the assessee, the burden shifts onto the

assessing officer. [Para 41]

s. 139 – Return of income – When to be treated as invalid return:

Held: U/s. 139(9), where the assessing officer considers that the

return of income furnished by the assessee is defective, he may

intimate the defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity

to rectify the defect within fifteen days from the date of such

intimation or within such further period, the assessing officer may

in his discretion allow – Burden is on the assessing officer – If

he does not exercise the discretion, the return of income cannot

be construed as a defective return – If the defect is not rectified

within the specified period or within the further period as may

be allowed, the return shall be treated as an invalid return – In

such an eventuality, it would be construed that the assessee

had failed to furnish the return. [Para 24.1-24.2]

Case Law Cited

Calcutta Discount Company Limited v. Income Tax

Officer, [1961] 2 SCR 241 : (1961) 41 ITR 1991 –

followed.

M/s Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. Income Tax Officer,

[1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 28 : (1993) 4 SCC 77; Srikrishna

Private Limited v. ITO, Calcutta, [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR

627 : (1996) 9 SCC 534; CIT, Delhi v. Kelvinator of India

Limited, [2010] 1 SCR 768 : (2010) 2 SCC 723; CIT v.

Bimal Kumar Damani, (2003) 261 ITR 87 (Cal); Income

Tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 3 SCR 956 :

1976 (3) SCC 757 : 1976 (103) ITR 437 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals cited

P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, Volume

2, Edition 6 – referred to.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 645

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

List of Acts

Income Tax Act, 1961; Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987

List of Keywords

Income Tax Jurisprudence; Concluded assessment; Reassessment;

Search and seizure operations; Disclosed income; Limitation period;

Reopening the assessment; Omission; Reason to believe; Time

limit; Full and true disclosure; Production of books of accounts;

Change of opinion.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8580-8582

of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2009 of the High Court of

Kerala at Ernakulam in ITA Nos.400 and 557 of 2009.

With

Civil Appeal Nos.8599-8603, 8604, 8593-8598, 8583-8587 and 8588-

8592 of 2011.

Appearances for Parties

Raghenth Basant, Ms. Kaushitaki Sharma, Ms. Liz Mathew, Advs.

for the Appellant.

N. Venkataraman, ASG, Shyam Gopal, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Prahlad

Singh, Shashank Bajpai, Suyash Pandey, Prashant Singh Ii, T. S.

Sabarish, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

The perennial question in income tax jurisprudence, whether

reopening of a concluded assessment i.e. reassessment under

Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (briefly “the Act” hereinafter)

following issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act is legally

sustainable or is bad in law, is again confronting us in the present

batch of appeals. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench,

Cochin (‘Tribunal’ hereinafter) had decided in favour of the assessee 

646 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

by setting aside the orders of reassessment. However, the High

Court of Kerala in appeals filed by the revenue under Section 260A

of the Act has reversed the findings of the Tribunal by deciding the

appeals preferred by the revenue in its favour.

2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the High Court of Kerala

(briefly “the High Court” hereinafter), the assessee had preferred

special leave petitions to appeal before this Court and on leave

being granted, civil appeals have been registered.

3. We have heard Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel for the

appellant/assessee (which would be referred to either as the appellant

or as the assessee) and Mr. Shyam Gopal, learned counsel for

the respondent/revenue (again, would be referred to either as the

respondent or as the revenue).

4. A brief narration of facts is necessary.

5. For the sake of convenience, we may refer to civil appeal Nos. 8580,

8581 and 8582 of 2011 (M/s Mangalam Publications, Kottayam Vs.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam).

6. The above three civil appeals pertain to assessment years 1990-91,

1991-92 and 1992-93.

7. The assessee was a partnership firm at the relevant point of time

though it got itself registered as a company since the assessment

year 1994-95. The assessee is carrying on the business of publishing

newspaper, weeklies and other periodicals in several languages

under the brand name “Mangalam”. Prior to the assessment year

1994-95 including the assessment years under consideration, the

status of the assessee was that of a firm, being regularly assessed

to income tax.

8. For the assessment year 1990-91, assessee filed return of income

on 22.10.1991 showing loss of Rs.5,99,390.00. Subsequently,

the assessee filed a revised computation showing income at

Rs.5,63,920.00. Assessee did not file any balance sheet alongwith

the return of income on the ground that books of account were

seized by the income tax department (department) in the course of

search and seizure operations on 03.12.1995 and that those books

of account were not yet returned. In the assessment proceedings, the

assessing officer did not accept the contention of the assessee and 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 647

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

made an analysis of the incomings and outgoings of the assessee

for the previous year under consideration. After considering various

heads of income and sale of publications, the assessing officer made

a lumpsum addition of Rs. 1 lakh to the disclosed income vide the

assessment order dated 29.01.1992 passed under Section 143 (3)

of the Act.

9. Likewise, for the assessment year 1991-1992, the assessee did not file

any balance sheet along with the return of income for the same reason

mentioned for the assessment year 1990-1991. The return of income

was filed on 22.10.1991 showing a loss of Rs.21,66,760.00. As per the

revised profit and loss account, the sale proceeds of the publications

were shown at Rs.8,21,24,873.00. Assessing officer scrutinised the

net sale proceeds as per the Audit Bureau of Circulation figure and

the certified Performance Audit Report. On that basis assessing

officer accepted the sale proceeds of Rs.8,21,24,873.00 as correct

being in conformity with the facts and figures available in the Audit

Bureau of Circulation report and the Performance Audit Report. After

considering the incomings and outgoings of the relevant previous year

assessing officer reworked the aforesaid figures but found that there

was a deficiency of Rs.29,17,931.00 in the incoming and outgoing

statement which the assessee could not explain. Accordingly, this

amount was added to the total income of the assessee. Further, the

assessee could not produce proper vouchers in respect of a number

of items of expenditure. Accordingly, an addition of Rs.1,50,000.00

was made to the total income of the assessee vide the assessment

order dated 29.01.2022 passed under Section 143 (3) of the Act.

10. For the assessment year 1992-1993 also, the assessee filed the

return of income on 07.12.1992 showing a loss of Rs.10,50,000.00.

However, a revised return was filed subsequently on 28.01.1993

showing loss of Rs.44,75,212.00. Like the earlier years, assessee

did not maintain books of account and did not file the balance sheet

for the same reason. However, the assessee disclosed total sale

proceeds of the weeklies at Rs.7,16,95,530.00 and also advertisement

receipts to the extent of Rs.40 lakhs. The profit was estimated at

Rs.41,63,500.00 before allowing depreciation.

10.1. On scrutiny of the performance certificate issued by the Audit

Bureau of Circulation, the assessing officer observed that total

sale proceeds of the weeklies after allowing sale commission 

648 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

came to Rs.7,22,94,757.00. Following the profit percentage

adopted in earlier years, the assessing officer estimated the

income from the weeklies and other periodicals at 7.50% before

depreciation, adding the estimated advertisement receipts of

Rs.40 lakhs to the total sale receipts of Rs.7,22,94,757.00.

The assessing officer held that the total receipt from sale of

weeklies and periodicals came to Rs.7,62,94,757.00. The profit

earned before depreciation at the rate of 7.50% on the turnover

came to Rs.57,22,106.00. In respect of the daily newspaper,

the assessing officer worked out the loss at Rs.22,95,872.00 as

against the loss of Rs.41,23,500.00 claimed by the assessee.

Taking an overall view of the matter, the assessing officer

estimated the business income of the assessee during the

assessment year 1992-1993 at Rs.10,00,000.00 vide the

assessment order dated 26.03.1993 passed under Section

143(3) of the Act.

11. It may be mentioned that for the assessment year 1993-1994, the

assessee had submitted the profit and loss account as well as the

balance sheet along with the return of income. While examining

the balance sheet, the assessing officer noticed that the balance in

the capital account of all the partners of the assessee firm together

was Rs.1,85,75,455.00 as on 31.03.1993 whereas the capital of the

partners as on 31.12.1985 was only Rs.2,55,117.00. According to

the assessing officer, none of the partners had any other source of

income apart from one of the partners, Smt. Cleramma Vargese, who

had a business under the name and style of “Mangalam Finance”.

As the income assessed for all the years was found to be not

commensurate with the increase in the capital by Rs.1,83,20,338.00

(Rs.1,85,75,455.00 – Rs.2,55,117.00) from 1985 to 1993, it was

considered necessary to reassess the income of the assessee as

well as that of the partners for the assessment years 1988-1989

to 1993-1994. After obtaining the approval of the Commissioner of

Income Tax, Trivandrum, notice under Section 148 of the Act was

issued and served upon the assessee on 29.03.2000.

12. In respect of the assessment year 1990-1991, the assessee informed

the assessing officer that the return of income filed which culminated

in the assessment order dated 29.01.1992 may be considered as the

return in the reassessment proceedings. The assessing officer took

cognizance of the profit and loss account and the balance sheet filed 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 649

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

by the assessee before the South Indian Bank on the basis of which

assessment of income for the assessment years 1988 - 1989 and 1989

- 1990 were completed. Objection of the assessee that the aforesaid

balance sheet was prepared only for the purpose of obtaining loan

from the South Indian Bank and therefore could not be relied upon

for income tax assessment was brushed aside. The reassessment

was made on the basis of the accounts submitted to the South Indian

Bank. By the reassessment order dated 21.03.2002 passed under

Section 144/147 of the Act, the assessing officer quantified the total

income of the assessee at Rs.29,66,910.00 whereafter order was

passed allocating income among the partners.

13. Likewise, for the assessment year 1991-1992, the assessing officer

passed reassessment order dated 21.03.2002 under Section 144/147

of the Act determining total income at Rs.13,91,700.00. Following the

same, allocation of income was also made amongst the partners.

14. In so far assessment year 1992-1993 is concerned, the assessing

officer passed the reassessment order also on 21.03.2002 under

Section 144/147 of the Act determining the total income of the

assessee at Rs.25,06,660.00. Thereafter allocation of income was

made amongst the partners in the manner indicated in the order of

reassessment.

15. At this stage, we may mention that the assessing officer had worked

out the escaped income for the three assessment years of 1990-91,

1991-92 and 1992-93 at Rs.50,96,041.00. This amount was further

apportioned between the three assessment years in proportion to

the sales declared by the assessee in the aforesaid assessment

years as under:

Sr. No. Assessment year Amount

1. 1990-91 Rs.19,05,476.00

2. 1991-92 Rs.16,83,910.00

3. 1992-93 Rs.15,06,655.00

Total Rs.50,96,041.00

rounded off to

Rs.50,96,040.00

16. Against the aforesaid three reassessment orders for the assessment

years 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93, assessee preferred three 

650 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

appeals before the first appellate authority i.e. Commissioner of

Income Tax (Appeals), IV Cochin (briefly “the CIT(A)” hereinafter).

Assessee raised the ground that it had disclosed all material facts

necessary for completing the assessments. The assessments having

been completed under Section 143(3) of the Act, the assessments

could not have been reopened after expiry of four years from the

end of the relevant assessment year as per the proviso to Section

147 of the Act. It was pointed out that the limitation period for the

last of the three assessment years i.e. 1992-93, had expired on

31.03.1997 whereas the notices under Section 148 of the Act were

issued and served on the assessee only on 29.03.2000. Therefore,

all the three reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation. The

assessee also argued that the alleged income escaping assessment

could not be computed on an estimate basis. In the present case,

the assessing officer had allocated the alleged escaped income for

the three assessment years in proportion to the corresponding sales

turnover. It was further argued that as per Section 282(2), notice

under Section 148 of the Act in the case of a partnership firm was

required to be made to a member of the firm. In the present case,

the notices were issued to the partnership firm. Therefore, such

notices could not be treated as valid.

16.1. CIT(A) rejected all the above contentions urged by the

assessee. CIT(A) relied on Section 139(9)(f) of the Act and

thereafter held that the assessee had not furnished the

details as per the aforesaid provisions and therefore fell

short of the requirements specified therein. Vide the common

appellate order dated 26.02.2004, CIT(A) held that, as the

assessee had failed to disclose all material facts necessary

to make assessments, therefore it could not be said that the

reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation in terms

of the proviso to Section 147. The other two grounds raised

by the assessee were also repelled by the first appellate

authority. Thereafter, CIT(A) made a detailed examination of

the factual aspect whereafter it proposed enhancement of

the quantum of escaped income. Following the same, CIT(A)

enhanced the assessment by fixing the unexplained income

at Rs.1,44,02,560.00 for the assessment years 1987-88 to

1993-94 which was thereafter apportioned in respect of the

relevant three assessment years. The pro-rata allotment of 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 651

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

escaped income for the three assessment years as directed

by CIT(A) are as follows:

Sr. No. Assessment year Escaped income

1. 1990-91 Rs.24,98,755.00

2. 1991-92 Rs.23,01,204.00

3. 1992-93 Rs.20,20,895.00

Total Rs.68,20,854.00

16.2. Thus, as against the total escaped income of Rs.50,96,040.00

for the above three assessment years as quantified by the

assessing officer, CIT(A) enhanced and redetermined such

income at Rs.68,20,854.00.

16.3. However, it would be relevant to mention that CIT(A) in the

appellate order had noted that the assessee had filed its balance

sheet as on 31.12.1985 while filing the return of income for

the assessment year 1986-87. The next balance sheet was

filed as on 31.03.1993. No balance sheet was filed in the

interregnum on the ground that it could not maintain proper

books of accounts as the relevant materials were seized by

the department in the course of a search and seizure operation

and not yet returned. CIT(A) further noted that the assessing

officer had taken the balance sheet as on 31.03.1989 filed by

the assessee before the South Indian Bank as the base for

reconciling the accounts of the partners. It was noticed that

CIT(A) in an earlier appellate order dated 26.03.2002 for the

assessment year 1989-90 in the assessee’s own case had

held that the profit and loss account and the balance sheet

furnished to the South Indian Bank were not reliable. CIT(A)

in the present proceedings agreed with such finding of his

predecessor and held that the unexplained portion, if any, of

the increase in capital and current account balance with the

assessee had to be analysed on the basis of the balance

sheet filed before the assessing officer as on 31.12.1985 and

as on 31.03.1993.

17. Aggrieved by the common appellate order passed by the CIT(A)

dated 26.02.2004, assessee preferred three separate appeals before

the Tribunal which were registered as under:

652 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(i) ITA No. 282(Coch)/2004 for the assessment year 1990-91.

(ii) ITA No. 283(Coch)/2004 for the assessment year 1991-92.

(iii) ITA No. 284(Coch)/2004 for the assessment year 1992-93.

17.1. In the three appeals filed by the assessee, revenue also filed

cross objections.

17.2. By the common order dated 29.10.2004, the Tribunal allowed

the appeals filed by the assessee and set aside the orders of

reassessment for the three assessment years as affirmed and

enhanced by the CIT(A). Tribunal held that the re-examination

carried out by the assessing officer was not based on any

fresh material or evidence. The reassessment orders could

not be sustained on the basis of the balance sheet filed by

the assessee before the South Indian Bank because in an

earlier appeal of the assessee itself, CIT(A) had held that

such balance sheet and profit and loss account furnished to

the bank were not reliable. The original assessments were

completed under Section 143(3) of the Act. Therefore, it was not

possible to hold that the assessee had not furnished necessary

details for completing the assessments at the time of original

assessment. In such circumstances, Tribunal held that the

case of the assessee squarely fell within the four corners of

the proviso to Section 147. Consequently, the reassessments

were held to be barred by limitation, thus without jurisdiction.

While allowing the appeals of the assessee, Tribunal dismissed

the cross objections filed by the revenue.

18. Against the aforesaid common order of the Tribunal, the respondent

preferred three appeals before the High Court under Section 260A

of the Act, being IT Appeal Nos. 400, 557 and 558 of 2009 for the

assessment years 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93 respectively. All

the three appeals were allowed by the High Court vide the common

order dated 12.10.2009. According to the High Court, the finding of

the Tribunal that the assessee had disclosed fully and truly all material

facts necessary for completion of the original assessments was not

tenable. Holding that there was no material before the Tribunal to

come to the conclusion that the assessee had disclosed fully and

truly all material facts required for completion of original assessments, 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 653

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and remanded the

appeals back to the Tribunal to consider the appeals on merit after

issuing notice to the parties.

19. It is against this order that the assessee had filed the special leave

petitions which on leave being granted have been registered as civil

appeals. The related civil appeals have been filed by the partners

of the assessee firm which would be dependent on the outcome of

the present set of civil appeals.

20. Respondent has filed counter affidavit supporting the judgment

under appeal. It is contended that the High Court has correctly

appreciated the facts and the law and thereafter given a reasoned

order as to why the reopening of assessment is valid. High Court

has correctly held that the assessee had not disclosed fully and truly

all the material facts necessary for completion of the assessments.

Adverting to Section 139 (9) of the Act, it is submitted that, it is not

mandatory for the assessing officer to treat a return as invalid even

if the return is defective under any of the sub-clauses of Section

139 (9). It is the discretion of the assessing officer to issue notice.

Since no notice was issued, the return and the assessment made

thereon would be valid.

20.1. It is submitted that the assessee had not even had accounts

pertaining to the advertisement receipts which is a major

source of income of a publication entity; as a matter of fact,

the assessee had shown the income from advertisements on

estimation basis.

20.2. Though the assessee had been claiming that it did not

maintain any books of account from the assessment years

1989- 1990 onwards, an audited balance sheet and profit and

loss account submitted to the South Indian Bank were traced

out and used as evidence against the assessee for reopening

the assessment for the assessment year 1989- 1990. In the

first appellate proceedings, CIT(A) took the view that the profit

shown in the statement was for availing credit facility only and

therefore set aside the reopening of assessment. Though the

Tribunal concurred with the view of CIT(A), the department

filed an appeal before the High Court. The assessing officer

had compared the balance of the partners in their capital

account in the firm in the said balance sheet (filed before the 

654 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

bank) with capital in the balance sheet filed for the assessment

year 1993 – 1994 and thereafter determined the probable

escapement of income which is fully justified and rightly upheld

by the High Court.

20.3. Respondent has contended that in the original assessments the

assessing officer had made the assessments on the basis of

limited information furnished by the assessee. The assessing

officer made the reassessments on the basis of the increase

in the capital in the balance sheets between the years ending

31.03.1989 and 31.03.1993. Respondent has denied that the

reassessments were made on the basis of change of opinion.

An audited balance sheet for the period ending 31.12.1984

was available with the department. Thereafter, no audited

or unaudited balance sheets were furnished on the ground

that books of account could not be maintained. However, an

audited balance sheet for the period ending 31.03.1993 was

furnished in the course of the assessment proceedings for the

assessment year 1993 – 1994. Another balance sheet for the

period ending 31.03.1989 which was claimed by the assessee

to be an account prepared only for submission before the South

Indian Bank for availing loan could be traced out. A perusal of

the balance sheet for the assessment year 1993-1994 revealed

that the increase in capital was not commensurate with the

income assessed on estimation basis by the assessing officer

for the assessment years 1989 – 1990 to 1992-1993. It was

in view of such changed circumstances that notices under

Section 148 were issued. The original assessments for the

assessment years 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and 1992 – 1993

were completed on 29.01.1992, 29.01.1992 and 26.03.1993

respectively. The balance sheet for the assessment year

1993 – 1994 which was used as the basis for reassessment

was not available with the assessing officer when the original

assessments were made. Facts available with the assessing

officer in the original assessments and in the reassessments

were different. Since facts were different, question of any

change in the opinion did not arise. In the circumstances

respondent sought for dismissal of the special leave petitions

since registered as civil appeals.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 655

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

21. Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel for the appellant at the outset

submits that the High Court fell in error while setting aside the wellreasoned and correct order of the Tribunal. Order of the High Court

should be set aside and the order of the Tribunal restored.

21.1. He submits that the appellant is a partnership firm engaged

in the business of publication of newspaper, weeklies and

other periodicals under the brand name “Mangalam”. Being

an assessee under the Act it was maintaining proper books

of accounts and had filed profit and loss accounts as well

as balance sheets along with the returns of income till the

assessment year 1985 – 1986. A search operation was carried

out by officials of the department under Section 132 of the Act

in the business premises of the appellant on 31.12.1985. In the

said search operation, books of account, registers and ledgers

of the appellant were seized. Because of the aforesaid, the

appellant was unable to maintain proper books of account as it

was not possible for it to obtain ledger balances to be brought

down for the succeeding accounting years. Nonetheless,

appellant maintained primary books of account and used to

prepare profit and loss accounts. It also used to prepare a

statement of source and application of funds in support of the

income returned by it in the returns of income. Being a member

of the Audit Bureau of Circulation, appellant was also required

to maintain exhaustive details regarding printing and sale of

newspaper and other periodicals published by it.

21.2. Learned counsel submits that returns were filed by the appellant

for the three assessment years in question. Those returns were

supported by profit and loss accounts and statements showing

the source and application of funds. Assessments for the three

assessment years were carried out and completed under

Section 143 (3) of the Act after making additions and providing

for certain disallowances. He submits that for the assessment

year 1993–1994, the appellant had maintained complete set of

books of account, audited profit and loss account and balance

sheet which were duly filed before the assessing officer.

Following assessment proceedings, assessing officer passed

the assessment order for the assessment year 1993 – 1994

on 27.01.1994 under Section 143 (3) of the Act. 

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21.3. More than eight to ten years after expiry of the relevant

assessment years, appellant was served with notices dated

29.03.2000 issued under Section 148 of the Act for the

assessment years 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and 1992 – 1993.

He submits that the basis for reassessment was purportedly

comparison of the current and capital accounts of the partners

of the assessee firm in the balance sheet filed along with the

return for the assessment year 1993 – 1994 with the capital

and current accounts of the partners as on 31.12.1985, which

showed unexplained increase. The revenue also sought to rely

upon the balance sheet for the assessment year 1988 – 1989

obtained by the assessing officer from the South Indian Bank

which was submitted by the assessee to the said bank to avail

credit facility. He submits that on such comparison the assessing

officer came to an erroneous conclusion that the profits for the

assessment years 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and 1992 -1993

would be Rs.1,86,57,246.00 and as the assessment for the

said years came to Rs.16,64,518.00 only, there was an under

assessment of income to the tune of Rs.1,69,92,728.00.

21.4. Learned counsel submits that during the reassessment

proceedings assessee sought for return of the books seized

by the department. Though some books were returned, the

entire seized materials were not returned. As it was an old

matter assessee had sought for time to look into the old records

and to consult its representative. However, the assessing

officer declined to grant time and went ahead and passed the

reassessment orders ex parte under Section 144/147 of the Act.

He submits that the assessing officer made the reassessment

on a comparison of the increase in the capital and current

accounts of the partners for the period from 1986 to 1993.

According to him, the assessing officer could not have done

that because the balance sheet for the assessment year 1989

– 1990, which was obtained by the assessing officer from the

South Indian Bank, was not prepared on actual and current

accounts; that was prepared on provisional and estimate basis

in the absence of the account books which were seized by the

department, that too, only for the purpose of obtaining credit

facilities from the bank.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 657

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

21.5. It is the submission of learned counsel for the assessee

that the High Court has erred in holding that even in the

absence of the entire books of accounts, the assessee had

not furnished the documents and particulars required under

Section 139 (9) (f) of the Act. According to the High Court

since the original assessment was completed without the

books of account and the details under Section 139 (9) (f)

being furnished, therefore, the assessee had not disclosed

fully and truly all material facts necessary for completion of

assessment. Learned counsel submits that for non-furnishing

of particulars under Section 139 (9) (f) the original assessment

would be rendered invalid. However, the assessing officer did

not adopt the aforesaid course of action but instead proceeded

to complete the assessments under Section 143 (3) of the Act.

In the circumstances, he submits that non furnishing of details

under Section 139 (9) (f) cannot lead to any inference that

material facts had not been disclosed so as to justify reopening

of assessments that too eight to ten years after expiry of the

relevant assessment years.

21.6. Learned counsel asserts that even though the assessee was

not maintaining regular books of accounts, all relevant details

necessary for making the assessments were furnished before

the assessing officer. These included detailed cash flow

statements, profit and loss accounts, statements showing the

source and application of funds reflecting the increase in the

capital and current accounts of the partners of the assessee

firm etc. It was thereafter that assessments were completed not

only in respect of the assessee for the above three assessment

years but also for the partners as well under Section 143(3)

of the Act.

21.7. It is contended by learned counsel for the assessee that

there was no specific information before the assessing officer

wherefrom he could form a reason to believe that income

exigible to income tax had escaped assessment for the three

assessment years. The only reason for initiating reassessment

proceedings was the impression of the assessing officer that

there was an increase in the capital and current accounts of

the partners upon a comparison of the balance sheets for

the assessment year 1985 – 1986 and for the assessment

year 1993 – 1994 which could not be properly explained. The 

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assessing officer also formed the above belief on the basis of

the balance sheet for the assessment year 1989 – 1990 which

was obtained from the South Indian Bank. According to him, on

both counts, the revenue could not have initiated proceedings

for reopening of concluded assessments that too under Section

143 (3) of the Act. He submits that CIT(A), in the appeal of

the assessee for the assessment year 1989 -1990, had clearly

held that such a balance sheet submitted before the bank was

not reliable. Learned counsel asserts that an assessing officer

would get the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment only on

the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information coming

to his possession subsequent to the original assessment and

not otherwise. In support of such submission learned counsel

has relied upon the decisions of this Court in:

(i) M/s Phool Chand Bajrang Lal Vs. Income Tax Officer,

(1993) 4 SCC 77.

(ii) Srikrishna Private Limited Vs. ITO, Calcutta,

(1996) 9 SCC 534.

21.8. Summing up his submissions, learned counsel submits that as

rightly held by the Tribunal, it was the change of view of the

assessing officer upon assessing the comparative accounts

of the partners which led to the reassessments which is not

based on any fresh material or evidence. It is evident that the

assessing officer had only reviewed the original assessments

on the basis of a fresh application of mind to the same set

of facts. Therefore, it is a clear case of change of opinion

leading to reassessment proceedings which is not permissible

in law as held by this Court in CIT, Delhi Vs. Kelvinator of

India Limited, (2010) 2 SCC 723. He therefore submits that

the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and that

of the Tribunal restored.

22. Mr. Shyam Gopal, learned counsel for the respondent at the outset

submits that there is no merit at all in the civil appeals, and therefore,

the civil appeals should be dismissed.

22.1. Adverting to Section 145 (1) of the Act, he submits that income

from the profits of business shall be computed in accordance

with the cash or mercantile or any other system of accounting

regularly employed by the assessee. Since the business income 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 659

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

had to be computed by following the method of accounting

adopted by the assessee and based on the books of accounts

so maintained, the assessee was required to produce the

books of accounts but when the books of accounts were not

available, at least to furnish the particulars in terms of Section

139 (9) (f) of the Act.

22.2. Referring to Section 139 (9) (f) of the Act, he submits that even

in the absence of regular books of accounts, the assessee is

bound to provide the information required under the aforesaid

provision. An assessee who does not disclose the above

information and instead submits returns on estimation basis

cannot claim that it has fully and truly disclosed all material

facts required for assessment.

22.3. According to Mr. Gopal, Tribunal erred in holding that the

assessee had disclosed fully and truly all material facts

necessary for assessment. In fact, Tribunal did not go into

the merit of the case. Rather, Tribunal held that there were

no materials before the assessing officer to take the view that

income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.

22.4. Learned counsel for the revenue strenuously argued that

assessing officer had made a comparative analysis of the

two balance sheets, one as on 31.12.1985 relevant to the

assessment year 1986-1987 and the balance sheet dated

31.03.1994 relevant to the assessment year 1994–1995

and found therefrom unexplained increase in the capital and

current accounts of the partners. That apart, the assessing

officer also obtained a balance sheet for the assessment year

1988–1989 from the South Indian Bank which also indicated

unexplained profits and gains of the partners. It was thereafter

that reassessment proceedings were initiated. First appellate

authority i.e. CIT(A) not only affirmed the reassessment orders

of the assessing officer but also enhanced the quantum of

escaped income which was restored by the High Court after

setting aside the reversal order of the Tribunal.

22.5. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted a

convenience compilation and drew the attention of the Court

therefrom to the relevant provisions of the Act i.e. Section 139

(9), 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149 and 151 of the Act, both pre 

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01.04.1989 and post 01.04.1989. He submits that there was

admittedly non-disclosure of material facts by the assessee,

and, therefore, the extended period under the proviso to Section

147 of the Act was available to the department. Viewed in the

above context, the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act

as well as the orders of reassessment passed under Section

144/147 of the Act were within limitation.

22.6. Learned counsel has specifically referred to Section 149 of

the Act which deals with the time limit for issuance of notice

under Section 148 of the Act. Post amendment with effect from

01.04.1989, he submits that under Section 149 (1) (b) (iii), the

limitation is, if seven years but not more than ten years had

elapsed from the relevant assessment year unless the income

chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to

or is likely to amount to rupees fifty thousand or more for that

year. In the instant case, the quantum of escaped assessment

is admittedly in excess of rupees fifty thousand. Therefore, the

notices issued under Section 148 of the Act on 29.03.2000 for

the three assessment years of 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and

1992 – 1993 were well within the limitation period.

22.7. Learned counsel has referred to the decision of this Court in

Calcutta Discount Company Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer,

(1961) 41 ITR 1991 and submits that the duty of disclosing all

the primary facts relevant to assessment before the assessing

authority lies on the assessee. Only when all the primary facts

are disclosed, the burden would shift to the assessing authority.

22.8. Asserting that the order of the High Court is fully justified,

learned counsel seeks dismissal of the civil appeals.

23. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received

the due consideration of the Court.

24. At the outset, we may advert to certain provisions of the Act as

existed at the relevant point of time having a bearing on the present

lis. Chapter XIV of the Act comprising Sections 139 to 158 deals with

procedure for assessment. Section 139 mandates filing of income

tax return. At the relevant point of time, this provision provided that

every person, if his total income or the total income of any other

person in respect of whom he was assessable under the Act during

the previous year had exceeded the maximum amount which is not 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 661

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

chargeable to income tax, he shall on or before the due date furnish

a return of his income or the income of such other person during the

previous year in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed

manner, setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed.

24.1. Since reference was made to sub-section (9)(f) of Section

139, both in the pleadings and in the oral hearing, we may

mention that under sub-section (9) of Section 139, where

the assessing officer considers that the return of income

furnished by the assessee is defective, he may intimate the

defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity to rectify

the defect within a period of fifteen days from the date of such

intimation or within such further period, the assessing officer

may in his discretion allow. If the defect is not rectified within

the specified period or within the further period as may be

allowed, the return shall be treated as an invalid return. In

such an eventuality, it would be construed that the assessee

had failed to furnish the return. There is an Explanation below

sub-section (9) which clarifies that a return of income shall

be regarded as defective unless all the conditions mentioned

thereunder are fulfilled. Clause (f) says that where regular

books of account are not maintained by the assessee but the

return is accompanied by a statement indicating the amounts

of turnover or gross receipts, gross profit, expenses and net

profit of the business or profession and the basis on which

such amounts have been computed and also disclosing the

amounts of total sundry debtors, sundry creditors, stock in

trade and cash balance as at the end of the previous year,

such a return shall not be treated as defective.

24.2. Thus, Section 139 places an obligation upon every person to

furnish voluntarily a return of his total income if such income

during the relevant previous year had exceeded the maximum

amount which is not chargeable to income tax. Under subsection (9), if there are defects in the return which are not

rectified within the stipulated period after being intimated by the

assessing officer, the return of income would be treated as an

invalid return. Of course, it would not be treated as defective

and consequently invalid if in a case, such as, under clause

(f) where regular books of account are not maintained but the

return of income is accompanied by a statement indicating the

amounts of turnover etc.

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25. Section 142 deals with enquiry before assessment. As per sub-section

(1), the assessing officer may issue notice upon an assessee who

has made a return seeking details of such accounts, information or

documents etc. which may be necessary for the purpose of making

an assessment. Sub-section (2) empowers the assessing officer

to make such enquiry as he considers necessary for obtaining full

information and sub-section (3) requires the assessing officer to

provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee in respect of any

material gathered on the basis of the enquiry.

26. This takes us to Section 143 which is the provision for assessment.

As per sub-section (1), where a return is made under Section 139 or

in response to a notice under Section 142(1), the assessing officer

may carry out adjustments in accordance with law and thereafter,

issue intimation to the assessee specifying the sums payable. Such

intimation shall be deemed to be a notice of demand under Section

156 of the Act.

26.1. Sub-section (2) provides that where a return has been furnished

under Section 139 or in response to a notice under sub-section

(1) of Section 142, to ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has

not under-paid the tax in any manner, the assessing officer

shall serve on the assessee a notice to produce evidence in

support of the claim made by the assessee.

26.2. As per sub-section (3) of Section 143, after hearing such

evidence as the assessee may produce and such other

evidence as the assessing officer may require on specified

points and after taking into account all relevant material

which he has gathered, the assessing officer shall make an

assessment of the total income or loss of the assessee by an

order in writing. In the said exercise, he shall determine the

sum payable by the assessee or refund of any amount due

to him on the basis of such assessment.

27. Section 144 provides for best judgment assessment. It says that if

any person fails to submit a return under sub-section (1) of Section

139 or fails to comply with the terms of a notice under sub-section

(1) of Section 142 or having made a return fails to comply with all

the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2) of Section 143,

the assessing officer after taking into account all relevant materials 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 663

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

and after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard make

the assessment to the best of his judgment and determine the sum

payable by the assessee on the basis of such assessment.

28. This brings us to the pivotal section i.e. Section 147. Prior to the

Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Section 147 read as under:

147. Income escaping assessment.—If

(a) the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that,

by reason of the omission or failure on the part of

an assessee to make a return under Section 139 for

any assessment year to the Income Tax Officer or to

disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for

his assessment for that year, income chargeable to

tax has escaped assessment for that year, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or

failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the

assessee, the Income Tax Officer has in consequence

of information in his possession reason to believe that

income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153,

assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss

or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for

the assessment year concerned (hereafter in Sections

148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).

28.1. This provision was amended by the Direct Tax Laws

(Amendment) Act, 1987 with effect from 01.04.1989. Post such

amendment, Section 147 read as under:

147. Income escaping assessment.—If the assessing

officer, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is

of the opinion that any income chargeable to tax has

escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may,

subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153, assess

or reassess such income and also any other income

chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and

which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of

the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss

or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as 

664 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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the case may be, for the assessment year concerned

(hereafter in this section and in Sections 148 to 153

referred to as the relevant assessment year).

28.2. As can be seen from the above, prior to 01.04.1989, the income

tax officer was required to have reason to believe that by reason

of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a

return under Section 139 for any assessment year or to disclose

fully and truly all material facts necessary for such assessment,

income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for that

assessment year or the income tax officer had in consequence

of information in his possession reason to believe that income

chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for any assessment

year, the income tax officer could reopen an assessment. But

with effect from 01.04.1989, the requirement of law underwent

a change. It was sufficient if the assessing officer for reasons

to be recorded by him in writing was of the opinion that any

income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for any

assessment year, he could assess or reassess such income

chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and which

came to his notice subsequently. Therefore, post 01.04.1989,

the power to reopen an assessment became much wider.

28.3. It appears that a number of representations were received

against the omission of the words “reason to believe” from

Section 147 and their substitution by the word “opinion” of the

assessing officer. It was pointed out by the representationists

that the meaning of the expression “reason to believe” was

explained in a number of judgments and was well settled.

Omission of such an expression from Section 147 would

give arbitrary powers to the assessing officer to reopen

past assessments. To allay such apprehensions, Parliament

enacted the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 again

amending Section 147 by re-introducing the expression “reason

to believe”. Section 147 after the amendment carried out by

the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 reads as under:

147. Income escaping assessment.—If the assessing

officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable

to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153,

assess or reassess such income and also any other 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 665

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment

and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course

of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the

loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance,

as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned

(hereafter in this section and in Sections 148 to 153 referred

to as the relevant assessment year).

28.4. Thus, Section 147 as it stood at the relevant point of time

provides that if the assessing officer has reason to believe

that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

for any assessment year, he may assess or re-assess such

income and such other income which has escaped assessment

and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of

proceedings under Section 147.

29. Section 148 says that before making an assessment, re-assessment

etc. under Section 147, the assessing officer is required to issue and

serve a notice on the assessee calling upon the assessee to file a

return of his income in the prescribed form etc., setting forth such

particulars as may be called upon.

30. Such a notice is subject to the time limit prescribed under Section

149. Under sub-Section (1)(b), no notice under Section 148 shall

be issued in a case where an assessment under sub-section (3) of

Section 143 or Section 147 has been made for such assessment year

if seven years but not more than 10 years have elapsed from the

end of the relevant assessment year unless the income chargeable

to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to

amount to Rs. 50,000 or more for that year.

31. At this stage, we deem it necessary to expound on the meaning of

disclosure. As per the P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon,

Volume 2, Edition 6, ‘to disclose’ is to expose to view or knowledge,

anything which before was secret, hidden or concealed. The word

‘disclosure’ means to disclose, reveal, unravel or bring to notice,

vide CIT Vs. Bimal Kumar Damani, (2003) 261 ITR 87 (Cal). The

word ‘true’ qualifies a fact or averment as correct, exact, actual,

genuine or honest. The word ‘full’ means complete. True disclosure

of concealed income must relate to the assessee concerned. Full

disclosure, in the context of financial documents, means that all

material or significant information should be disclosed. Therefore,

the meaning of ‘full and true disclosure’ is the voluntary filing of a 

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return of income that the assessee earnestly believes to be true.

Production of books of accounts or other material evidence that could

ordinarily be discovered by the assessing officer does not amount

to a true and full disclosure.

32. Let us now discuss some of the judgments cited at the bar. First

and foremost is the decision of a constitution bench of this Court in

Calcutta Discount Company Limited (supra). That was a case under

Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 which is in parimateria to Section 147 of the Act. The constitution bench explained

the purport of Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 and

highlighted two conditions which would have to be satisfied before

issuing a notice to reopen an assessment beyond four years but

within eight years (as was the then limitation). The first condition

was that the income tax officer must have reason to believe that

income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax had been underassessed. The second condition was that he must have also reason

to believe that such under-assessment had occurred by reason of

either (i) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a

return of his income under Section 22, or (ii) omission or failure on

the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts

necessary for his assessment for that year. It was emphasized that

both these were conditions precedent to be satisfied before the

income tax officer could have jurisdiction to issue a notice for the

assessment or re-assessment beyond the period of four years but

within the period of eight years from the end of the year in question.

The words used in the expression “omission or failure to disclose

fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that

year” would postulate a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and

truly all material facts necessary for his assessment though what

facts are material and necessary for assessment would differ from

case to case. On the above basis, this Court came to the conclusion

that while the duty of the assessee is to disclose fully and truly all

primary facts, it does not extend beyond this. This position has been

reiterated in subsequent decisions by this Court including in Income

Tax Officer Vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, 1976 (3) SCC 757; 1976 (103)

ITR 437. The expression “reason to believe” has also been explained

to mean reasons deducible from the materials on record and which

have a live link to the formation of the belief that income chargeable

to tax has escaped assessment. Such reasons must be based on

material and specific information obtained subsequently and not on 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 667

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

the basis of surmises, conjectures or gossip. The reasons formed

must be bona fide.

33. In Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (supra), this Court examined the purport

of Section 147 of the Act and observed that the object of Section 147

is to ensure that a party cannot get away by willfully making a false

or untrue statement at the time of original assessment and when

that falsity comes to notice, to turn around and say “you accepted

my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing”. This Court

opined that it would be a travesty of justice to allow an assessee

such latitude. After adverting to various previous decisions, this

Court held that an income tax officer acquires jurisdiction to reopen

an assessment under Section 147(a) read with Section 148 of the

Act only if on the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information

coming to his possession subsequently, he has reasons, which he

must record, to believe that due to omission or failure on the part of

the assessee to make a true and full disclosure of all material facts

necessary for his assessment during the concluded assessment

proceedings, any part of his income, profit or gains chargeable to

income tax has escaped assessment. In the above context, Supreme

Court has held as under:

25. …...He may start reassessment proceedings either

because some fresh facts come to light which were not

previously disclosed or some information with regard to

the facts previously disclosed comes into his possession

which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In

such situations, it is not a case of mere change of opinion

or the drawing of a different inference from the same facts

as were earlier available but acting on fresh information.

Since, the belief is that of the Income Tax Officer, the

sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief, is not for the

Court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish

that there in fact existed no belief or that the belief was not

at all a bona fide one or was based on vague, irrelevant

and non-specific information. To that limited extent, the

Court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the Income

Tax Officer and examine whether there was any material

available on the record from which the requisite belief

could be formed by the Income Tax Officer and further

whether that material had any rational connection or a 

668 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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live link for the formation of the requisite belief. It would

be immaterial whether the Income Tax Officer at the time

of making the original assessment could or, could not

have found by further enquiry or investigation, whether

the transaction was genuine or not, if on the basis of

subsequent information, the Income Tax Officer arrives at a

conclusion, after satisfying the twin conditions prescribed in

Section 147(a) of the Act, that the assessee had not made

a full and true disclosure of the material facts at the time

of original assessment and therefore income chargeable

to tax had escaped assessment.……

34. This Court in the case of Srikrishna Private Limited (supra) emphasized

that what is required of an assessee in the course of assessment

proceedings is a full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary

for making assessment for that year. It was emphasized that it is the

obligation of the assessee to disclose the material facts or what are

called primary facts. It is not a mere disclosure but a disclosure which

is full and true. Referring to the decision in Phool Chand Bajrang

Lal (supra), it has been highlighted that a false disclosure is not a

true disclosure and would not satisfy the requirement of making a

full and true disclosure. The obligation of the assessee to disclose

the primary facts necessary for his assessment fully and truly can

neither be ignored nor watered down. All the requirements stipulated

by Section 147 must be given due and equal weight.

35. Kelvinator of India Limited (supra) is a case where this Court examined

the question as to whether the concept of “change of opinion”

stands obliterated with effect from 01.04.1989 i.e. after substitution

of Section 147 of the Act by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act,

1987. This Court considered the changes made in Section 147 and

found that prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987,

reopening could be done under two conditions i.e., (a) the Income

Tax Officer had reason to believe that by reason of omission or failure

on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 for

any assessment year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts

necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax

had escaped assessment for that year, or (b) notwithstanding that

there was no such omission or failure on the part of the assessee,

the Income Tax Officer had in consequence of information in his 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 669

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had

escaped assessment for any assessment year. Fulfilment of the

above two conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the assessing

officer to make a re-assessment. But with effect from 01.04.1989,

the above two conditions have been given a go-by in Section 147

and only one condition has remained, viz, that where the assessing

officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment,

that would be enough to confer jurisdiction on the assessing officer

to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post 01.04.1989, power to

reopen assessment is much wider. However, this Court cautioned that

one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason

to believe”, otherwise Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to

the assessing officer to reopen assessments on the basis of “mere

change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to reopen.

35.1. This Court also referred to Circular No.549 dated 31.10.1989

of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to allay the

apprehension that omission of the expression “reason to

believe” from Section 147 and its substitution by the word

“opinion” would give arbitrary powers to the assessing officer

to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion and

pointed out that in 1989 Section 147 was once again amended

to reintroduce the expression “has reason to believe” in place

of the expression “for reasons to be recorded by him in writing,

is of the opinion”. This Court thereafter explained as under:

6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference

between power to review and power to reassess. The

assessing officer has no power to review; he has the

power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based

on fulfilment of certain precondition and if the concept of

“change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf

of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the

assessment, review would take place.

7. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as

an in-built test to check abuse of power by the assessing

officer. Hence, after 1-4-1989, the assessing officer has

power to reopen, provided there is “tangible material”

to come to the conclusion that there is escapement

of income from assessment. Reasons must have a 

670 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets

support from the changes made to Section 147 of the

Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws

(Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted

the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the

word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. However, on

receipt of representations from the companies against

omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament

reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word

“opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary

powers in the assessing officer.

36. Elaborating further on the expression “change of opinion”, this Court

in Techspan India Private Limited (supra) observed that to check

whether it is a case of change of opinion or not one would have

to see its meaning in literal as well as legal terms. The expression

“change of opinion” would imply formulation of opinion and then

a change thereof. In terms of assessment proceedings, it means

formulation of belief by the assessing officer resulting from what he

thinks on a particular question. Therefore, before interfering with

the proposed reopening of the assessment on the ground that the

same is based only on a change of opinion, the court ought to verify

whether the assessment earlier made has either expressly or by

necessary implication expressed an opinion on a matter which is the

basis of the alleged escapement of income that was taxable. If the

assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or perfunctory in nature, it

may be difficult to attribute to the assessing officer any opinion on the

questions that are raised in the proposed reassessment proceedings.

37. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed before the Court in

the convenience compilation the reasons recorded by the assessing

officer for initiating reassessment proceedings. The same is extracted

as under:

Reasons for the belief that income has escaped assessment.

As per the last balance sheet of the assessee for AY

1989-90 obtained from the South Indian Bank, the capital

of the assessee is as under:-

Fixed capital of partners. Rs. 20,50,000/-

Investment allowance. Rs. 41,47,873/-

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 671

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

Current a/c of partners. Rs. 44,28,597/-

 ________________

Total Rs. 1,06,26,470/-

 ________________

The B/S/P & L a/c for the intervening period is not available.

But the balance sheet/P&L a/c for AY 1993-94 shows

increase in capital which is as under:

Fixed capital of partners. Rs. 20,50,000/-

Investment allowance. Rs. 40,02,614/-

Current a/c of partners. Rs. 1,65,25,455/-

 ________________

Total Rs. 2,25,78,069/-

 ________________

The difference of Rs. 1,19,51,599/- is obviously the profit

of the assessee during the AY 1990-91 to 1993-94. The

profit of AY 1993-94 as per the accounts is Rs. 5,08,548/-.

If this is excluded, the profit for the three years i.e. 1990-

91, 1991-92 and AY 1992-93 is Rs. 1,14,43,051/-. The

profit will be more, if the drawings during the period of

the partners are included. The drawings and taxes paid is:

drawings taxes paid

1990-91 Rs.20,30,584/- Rs.2,48,287/-

1991-92 Rs.18,87,648/-

1992-93 Rs.29,12,038/- Rs.2,72,212/-

1993-94

(Figures not available from

assessment records.)

Rs.68,30,270/- Rs.3,83,925/-

Thus, the profit for the three years would be Rs. 1,86,

57, 246/- (1,14,43,051 + 68,30,270 + 3,83,925). Under

assessment of income for the three years is, therefore,

Rs.1,69,92,728 i.e., (18657246 – 1664518).

The sales estimated by AO for each of the 3 years less

depreciation for each year is taken as the basis for

determining the proportion in which the under-assessment

has been made.

672 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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AY Sales

estimated

by AO

Depreciation Balance UnderAssessment

1990-91 90079199 4329815 85749384 6324989

1991-92 82124877 6222432 75902441 5598817

1992-93 72294757 3575079 68719678 5068892

Total under-assessment 16992728

In view of the above, I have reason to believe that by

reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee

to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for

his assessment, income as determined above, chargeable

to tax has escaped assessment.

38. Thus, from a reading of the reasons recorded by the assessing officer

leading to formation of his belief that income of the assessee had

escaped assessment for the assessment years under consideration,

it is seen that the only material which came into possession of

the assessing officer subsequently was the balance sheet of the

assessee for the assessment year 1989-90 obtained from the

South Indian Bank. After obtaining this balance sheet, the assessing

officer compared the same with the balance sheet and profit loss

account of the assessee for the assessment year 1993-94. On such

comparison, the assessing officer noticed significant increase in the

current and capital accounts of the partners of the assessee. On that

basis, he drew the inference that profit of the assessee for the three

assessment years under consideration would be significantly higher

which had escaped assessment. The figure of under assessment was

quantified at Rs.1,69,92,728.00. Therefore, he recorded that he had

reason to believe that due to omission or failure on the part of the

assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the

assessments, incomes chargeable to tax for the three assessment

years had escaped assessment.

39. Assessee did not submit regular balance sheet and profit and loss

account for the three assessment years under consideration on the

ground that books of account and other materials/documents of the

assessee were seized by the department in the course of search and

seizure operation which were not yet returned to the assessee. In 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 673

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

the absence of such books etc., it became difficult for the assessee

to maintain yearwise regular books of account etc. However, regular

books of account and profit and loss account were filed by the

assessee along with the return of income for the assessment year

1993-94. What the assessing officer did was to cull out the figures

discernible from the balance sheet for the assessment year 1989-90

obtained from the South Indian Bank and compared the same with

the balance sheet submitted by the assessee before the assessing

officer for the assessment year 1993-94 and thereafter arrived at

the aforesaid conclusion.

40. It may be mentioned that the assessee had filed its regular balance

sheet as on 31.12.1985 while filing the return of income for the

assessment year 1986-87. The next balance sheet filed was as on

31.03.1993 for the assessment year 1993-94. No balance sheet

was filed in the interregnum as according to the assessee, it could

not maintain proper books of account as the relevant materials were

seized by the department in the course of a search and seizure

operation and not yet returned. It was not possible for it to obtain

ledger balances to be brought down for the succeeding accounting

years. As regards the balance sheet as on 31.03.1989 filed by the

assessee before the South Indian Bank and which was construed by

the assessing officer to be the balance sheet of the assessee for the

assessment year 1989-90, the explanation of the assessee was that

it was prepared on provisional and estimate basis and was submitted

before the South Indian Bank for obtaining credit and therefore could

not be relied upon in assessment proceedings. It appears that this

balance sheet was also relied upon by the assessing officer in the

re-assessment proceedings of the assessee for the assessment year

1989-90. In the first appellate proceedings, CIT(A) in its appellate

order dated 26.03.2002 held that such profit and loss account and

the balance sheet furnished to the South Indian Bank were not

reliable and had discarded the same. That being the position, the

assessing officer could not have placed reliance on such balance

sheet submitted by the assessee allegedly for the assessment year

1989-90 to the South Indian Bank for obtaining credit. Dehors such

balance sheet, there were no other material in the possession of

the assessing officer to come to the conclusion that income of the 

674 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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assessee for the three assessment years had escaped assessment.

41. It is true that Section 139 places an obligation upon every person to

furnish voluntarily a return of his total income if such income during

the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not

chargeable to income tax. The assessee is under further obligation

to disclose all material facts necessary for his assessment for that

year fully and truly. However, as has been held by the constitution

bench of this Court in Calcutta Discount Company Limited (supra),

while the duty of the assessee is to disclose fully and truly all primary

and relevant facts necessary for assessment, it does not extend

beyond this. Once the primary facts are disclosed by the assessee,

the burden shifts onto the assessing officer. It is not the case of

the revenue that the assessee had made a false declaration. On

the basis of the “balance sheet” submitted by the assessee before

the South Indian Bank for obtaining credit which was discarded

by the CIT(A) in an earlier appellate proceeding of the assessee

itself, the assessing officer upon a comparison of the same with

a subsequent balance sheet of the assessee for the assessment

year 1993-94 which was filed by the assessee and was on record,

erroneously concluded that there was escapement of income and

initiated reassessment proceedings.

42. We may also mention that while framing the initial assessment

orders of the assessee for the three assessment years in question,

the assessing officer had made an independent analysis of the

incomings and outgoings of the assessee for the relevant previous

years and thereafter had passed the assessment orders under

Section 143(3) of the Act. We have already taken note of the fact

that an assessment order under Section 143(3) is preceded by

notice, enquiry and hearing under Section 142(1), (2) and (3) as

well as under Section 143(2). If that be the position and when the

assessee had not made any false declaration, it was nothing but a

subsequent subjective analysis of the assessing officer that income

of the assessee for the three assessment years was much higher

than what was assessed and therefore, had escaped assessment.

This is nothing but a mere change of opinion which cannot be a

ground for reopening of assessment.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 675

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

43. There is one more aspect which we may mention. Admittedly, the

returns for the three assessment years under consideration were not

accompanied by the regular books of account. Though under subsection (9)(f) of Section 139, such returns could have been treated

as defective returns by the assessing officer and the assessee

intimated to remove the defect failing which the returns would

have been invalid, however, the materials on record do not indicate

that the assessing officer had issued any notice to the assessee

bringing to its notice such defect and calling upon the assessee to

rectify the defect within the period as provided under the aforesaid

provision. In other words, the assessing officer had accepted the

returns submitted by the assessee for the three assessment years

under question. At this stage, we may also mention that it is the case

of the assessee that though it could not maintain and file regular

books of account with the returns in the assessment proceedings

for the three assessment years under consideration, nonetheless it

had prepared and filed the details of accounts as well as incomings

and outgoings of the assessee etc. for each of the three assessment

years which were duly verified and enquired into by the assessing

officer in the course of the assessment proceedings which culminated

in the orders of assessment under sub-section (3) of Section 143.

Suffice it to say that a return filed without the regular balance sheet

and profit and loss account may be a defective one but certainly not

invalid. A defective return cannot be regarded as an invalid return.

The assessing officer has the discretion to intimate the assessee

about the defect(s) and it is only when the defect(s) are not rectified

within the specified period that the assessing officer may treat the

return as an invalid return. Ascertaining the defects and intimating

the same to the assessee for rectification, are within the realm

of discretion of the assessing officer. It is for him to exercise the

discretion. The burden is on the assessing officer. If he does not

exercise the discretion, the return of income cannot be construed

as a defective return. As a matter of fact, in none of the three

assessment years, the assessing officer had issued any declaration

that the returns were defective.

44. Assessee has asserted both in the pleadings and in the oral hearing 

676 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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that though it could not file regular books of account along with the

returns for the three assessment years under consideration because

of seizure by the department, nonetheless the returns of income

were accompanied by tentative profit and loss account and other

details of income like cash flow statements, statements showing the

source and application of funds reflecting the increase in the capital

and current accounts of the partners of the assessee etc., which

were duly enquired into by the assessing officer in the assessment

proceedings.

45. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we are

therefore of the view that the Tribunal was justified in coming to the

conclusion that the reassessments for the three assessment years

under consideration were not justified. The High Court has erred in

reversing such findings of the Tribunal. Consequently, we set aside

the common order of the High Court dated 12.09.2009 and restore

the common order of the Tribunal dated 29.10.2004.

46. The above conclusions reached by us would cover the other civil

appeals of this batch as well. Resultantly, all the civil appeals filed

by the assessee and its partners are hereby allowed. No costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

Whether the Agreement between the seller and the buyer discloses a fixed time-frame for making payment in full by the buyer that is, in terms of the recitals in the agreement for sale executed by the seller in favour of the buyer.

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 374 : 2024 INSC 28

Alagammal and Ors.

v.

Ganesan and Anr.

(Civil Appeal No. 8185 of 2009)

10 January 2024

[Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the Agreement between the seller and the buyer discloses

a fixed time-frame for making payment in full by the buyer that is,

in terms of the recitals in the agreement for sale executed by the

seller in favour of the buyer.

Headnotes

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific performance of contract

– Time, if essence of contract – Seller and the buyer entered

into registered agreement to sell property on 22.11.1990 for a

consideration of Rs.21,000/- - Advance payment of Rs. 3000/-

received by the seller and the transaction was to be completed

within six months – However, on 05.11.1997, seller executed

a Sale Deed with regard to the property in question with the

third person for a consideration of Rs.22,000/- - Thereafter,

issuance of notice by the buyer to the seller calling upon

the seller to execute the agreement – Subsequently, suit for

specific performance of the Agreement, damages and for

recovery of money with interest filed by the buyer against the

seller – Dismissal of the suit – Appeal thereagainst allowed

by the First Appellate Court, and upheld by the High Court

– Correctness:

Held: Within six months there existed the onus of paying the entire

balance amount by the buyer to the seller – From the payment of

Rs.7,000/- out of Rs.21,000/-, as indicated in the notice sent by the

buyer, it is clear that the buyer had not complied with their obligation

under the Agreement within the six-month period and neither they

offered to pay the remaining/balance amount before the expiry of the

six-month period – Seller having accepted payment of Rs.1,000/-

on 21.04.1997, after seller had executed a Sale Deed in favour of

the third party, coupled with the fact that the forensic expert found 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 375

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

the two thumb-impressions purportedly acknowledging payment

after the expiry of the time fixed not matching the fingerprints of

seller is clearly indicative that time having not been extended,

no enforceable right accrued to the buyer for getting relief under

the 1963 Act – If the seller had accepted money from buyer after

the expiry of the time-limit, which itself has not been conclusively

proved during trial or even at the first or second appellate stages,

the remedy available to the buyer was to seek recovery of money

paid along with damages or interest to compensate such loss but

suit for specific performance to execute the Sale Deed would not

be available – Furthermore, though the third party was arrayed

as a defendant in the suit, yet no relief seeking cancellation of his

Sale Deed was sought for – Even if the case of later payments

by the buyer to the seller is accepted, the same being at great

intervals and there being no willingness shown by them to pay the

remaining amount or getting the sale deed ascribed on necessary

stamp paper and giving notice to the seller to execute the sale

deed, it cannot be said that judged on the anvil of the conduct of

parties, especially the seller, time would not remain the essence

of the contract – Judgment of the High Court as also the First

Appellate Court set aside and that of the trial court is restored.

[Paras 24-26, 28-30]

Case Law Cited

K.S. Vidyanadam v Vairavan, [1997] 1 SCR 993 :

(1997) 3 SCC 1; Godhra Electricity Company Limited

v State of Gujarat, [1975] 2 SCR 42 : (1975) 1 SCC

199 – referred to.

Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

v Secret Hotels Limited (formerly Med Hotels Limited),

[2014] UKSC 16 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited

Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 7th

Edition - refered to.

List of Acts

Specific Relief Act, 1963

List of Keywords

Agreement for sale; Specific Relief; Specific performance; Time, 

376 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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essence of contract; Consideration amount; Advance payment;

Sale Deed; Legal notice; Suit for specific performance; Stamp

papers; Forensic expert; Thumb-impressions; Fingerprints;

Enforceable right; Remedy; Recovery of money; Damages; Interest;

Compensate; Willingness; Conduct of parties.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8185 of 2009.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2009 of the High Court

of Madras in SA No.1127 of 2008.

Appearances for Parties

V. Prabhakar, Ms. E.R. Sumathy, Ms. Jyothi Parashar, N.

J.Ramchandar, Advs. for the Appellants.

P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Y. Lokesh, V. Kandha

Prabhu, V. Sibi Kargil, Ms. Maitri Goal, Ms. Sonali Patra, Sachin

Kumar Verma, Ms. Divya, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The present appeal is directed against the Final Judgment dated

28.04.2009 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”)

passed by the Madurai Bench, Madras High Court (hereinafter

referred to as “the High Court”) dismissing a Second Appeal [S.A.

(MD) No.1127 of 2008] filed by the appellants/original defendants.

BRIEF FACTS:

3. The appellants no.1, 2 and 3 entered into a registered Agreement of

Sale (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”) with the respondents

on 22.11.1990 to sell the suit property for a consideration of

Rs.21,000/-, against which Rs.3000/- had been received in advance.

Further, six months’ time was fixed for completion of the transaction.

The appellants No.1, 2 & 3, in the meantime, had executed a Sale

Deed with regard to the property in question with appellant no.7 on

05.11.1997 for a consideration of Rs.22,000/-. On 18.11.1997, the 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 377

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

respondents sent a Notice to the appellants calling upon them to

execute the Agreement. This led to the respondents filing of Original

Suit No.165 of 1998 before the Munsif, District Court, Dindigul

against the appellants for specific performance of the Agreement,

damages and for recovery of money with interest. The suit stood

dismissed by the Principal District Munsif Judge, Dindigul by order

dated 10.09.2000. An appeal bearing A.S. No.258 of 2008 filed by

the respondents was allowed by the First Appellate Court, and the

same has been upheld by the High Court by the Impugned Judgment

dated 28.04.2009.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:

4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that as per the

Agreement, the balance consideration amount of Rs. 18,000/- was

to be paid within six months which was admittedly not done. He

submitted that the so-called subsequent payments on 16.12.1990

of Rs.1,000/-; on 15.04.1991 of Rs.3,000/-, and; on 17.09.1991 of

Rs.2,500/- though were not actually paid to the appellants and even

without admitting the same and accepting it for the sake of argument,

the same is incorrect as the fingerprint expert has found the thumbimpression of the appellant no.1 as not matching the admitted actual

sample thumb-impression of the appellant no.1. and, thus, the very

basis of holding that time was not the essence of the agreement

gets washed away. It was submitted that the Agreement stipulated

that if there was default on the part of the respondents, the advance

paid would be forfeited, and the entitlement to obtain the Sale Deed

and get possession free from all encumbrances would also end.

5. It was submitted that once the fingerprint has been disapproved of by

an expert and such report has been brought before the First Appellate

Court, the claim based on such a document on which forgery has

been committed itself renders the whole transaction inadmissible in

law on the well-settled principle that the respondents did not come

before the Court with clean hands as the entire claim was based

on a forged document.

6. It was submitted that the claim of the respondents to have paid

Rs.3,000/- on 18.09.1992; Rs.1,800/- on 24.07.1996; Rs.1,300/- on

25.07.1996 and Rs.1,000/- on 29.07.1996 i.e., a total of Rs.20,425/- 

378 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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and ultimately Rs.1,000/- on 21.04.1997 i.e., an excess of Rs. 425/-

over the amount indicated in the Agreement, was false.

7. Learned counsel submitted that the endorsement(s) made not having

been proved, it cannot be assumed that the respondents were ready

and willing, or that they had, in fact, paid the excess amount.

8. It was contended that the Legal Notice sent on behalf of the

respondents dated 18.11.1997 was clearly to get over the fatal

lapses on their part and to give life to a dead cause i.e., revive the

Agreement, which already stood incapable of being executed through

Court due to efflux of time. On this issue, the contention was that

readiness and willingness must be pleaded and proved which has not

been done as is clear from the averments made in the plaint filed by

the respondents. Thus, it was submitted that the trial court and even

the First Appellate Court not recording any finding on the aspect of

the readiness and willingness on the part of the respondents, the

High Court’s observation in the Impugned Judgement on readiness

and willingness of the respondents is without basis.

9. Learned counsel submitted that readiness and willingness has to be

specifically pleaded and proved as per Section 16(c) of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “1963 Act”) and there

cannot be any question of drawing inference. Thus, he submitted that

the respondents were obliged to obtain stamp-paper and draw up the

Sale Deed, of which there is no indication in the plaint. It was urged

that this establishes that there was no readiness and willingness to

comply with their obligations in terms of the Agreement.

10. Learned counsel submitted that the thumb-impression(s) in the

endorsement(s) have neither matched nor been found to be identical

as per the fingerprint expert’s report which has been referred to in

the judgment of the First Appellate Court.

11. Learned counsel submitted that as per the judgment rendered by

the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court, the last

payment made and endorsed on 17.09.1991 has been accepted and

thus three years from such date would be 16.09.1994 but the suit was

instituted only on 23.03.1998, which is clearly barred by limitation.

12. It was submitted that the Trial Court had found that the endorsements

were silent regarding extension of time, which finding has not been

disturbed either by the First Appellate Court or the High Court and 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 379

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

looking at the issue from such angle, six months’ time under the

Agreement would expire on 21.05.1991 and a three-year limitation

would end on 22.05.1994. On this, learned counsel submitted that

the contention of the respondents that the limitation would start

from the judgment rendered in Original Suit No.551 of 1992 dated

24.07.1996, filed by appellant no.1 for seeking possession and eviction

of her husband and mother-in-law from the suit property, is not the

correct legal perspective, as mere absence of possession would not

have defeated the passing of title from the appellants in favour of

the respondents by the execution of a Sale Deed. The object of the

Agreement was only for conveying the title of the property in question.

13. Learned counsel submitted that neither Original Suit No.551 of 1992

nor the judgment rendered therein have been mentioned by the

respondents in Original Suit No.165 of 1998 for computing the cause

of action for filing suit in the year 1998 with regard to the Agreement,

which was entered into in 1990. Further, it was urged that it was

incumbent upon the respondents to have obtained the Sale Deed

and possession through Court as set forth in the Default Clause in

the Agreement and thus, the Legal Notice dated 18.11.1997 by the

respondents would not extend the time as it had expired much before

and such unilateral issuance of notice would not get over the legal

bar of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to

as the “Act”).

14. Learned counsel summed up arguments by contending that in any

view of the matter, prior to filing of the suit, the property in question had

already been sold under registered Sale Deed to the appellant no.7

and the suit for specific performance was required to be dismissed

as the Sale Deed to appellant no.7 has not been challenged.

15. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in K.S.

Vidyanadam v Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1, at Paragraphs 10, 11

and 13 for the proposition that Courts in India have consistently held

that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property,

time is not the essence of the contract unless specifically provided

to that effect, and the period of limitation prescribed by the Act for

filing a suit was 3 years.

16. It was contended that in the aforesaid judgment, the terms of the

agreement therein were identical to the instant Agreement, inasmuch

as there was no reference to any tenant in the building and it was 

380 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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stated that within six months, the plaintiff should purchase the

stamp-papers and pay the balance consideration upon which the

defendants shall execute the Sale Deed either in his name or the

name(s) proposed by him before the Sub-Registrar. It was restated

that there was no prior letter/notice from the plaintiffs (respondents)

to the defendants (appellants) calling upon them to get the Sale Deed

executed till the issuance of the Legal Notice dated 18.11.1997 i.e.,

after a gap of 6 ½ years, identical to the facts in K.S. Vidyanadam

(supra).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:

17. In opposition to the appeal, learned counsel for the respondents

submitted that on 23.03.1992, appellant no.1 had filed Original Suit

No.551 of 1992 against her husband, mother-in-law, second wife of

her husband and the son of the second wife, which was decreed.

He submitted that appellants even after accepting Rs.425/- over

and above the amount indicated in the Agreement and even after

getting a decree for declaration and possession of the suit property

in her favour on 24.07.1996, did not execute the Sale Deed due

to which Legal Notice was sent to her on 18.11.1997. As no action

was taken, the respondents were forced to file a suit on 23.03.1998

seeking specific performance.

18. Learned counsel submitted that the First Appellate Court had recorded

that the Sale Deed executed by appellant no.1 in favour of appellant

no.7 dated 05.11.1997 was not bonafide as the said sale was effected

after getting an order for declaration and recovery of possession of

the suit property in favour of appellant no.1 on 24.07.1996 in Original

Suit No.551 of 1992.

19. Learned counsel submitted that the issue whether time is the

essence of the contract i.e., the Agreement would depend also on

the conduct of the parties and in the present case, when money

was accepted by appellant no.1, much after the stipulated time,

clearly the Agreement’s validity so as to culminate in sale could not

be said to have been extinguished, as by accepting money later,

the time indicated for completion of the transaction by execution of

Sale Deed had been relaxed.

20. It was contended that the actual intention of the parties was not

only to execute the Sale Deed but also handover the possession 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 381

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

which is an implied term of every sale of immovable property and

thus only when on 24.07.1996, the appellant concerned became

capable of handing over possession, limitation would start from such

date as otherwise even if the Sale Deed was executed in favour of

the respondents, it would have been of no real consequence in the

absence of possession being capable of hand over.

21. Learned counsel contended that the stand taken by the appellants,

that the proposed sale was only for transfer of title and not possession,

cannot be accepted since the sale of immovable property is always

for the transfer of possession from the seller to the buyer in terms of

Section 5 read with Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

(hereinafter referred to as the “TP Act”). Further, it was submitted that

Section 55(f) of the TP Act contemplates duty of the seller to hand

over possession of the property at the time of sale, and if the seller

is not in possession of the property at the time of the agreement to

sell or thereafter, it is a “material defect” in the property necessarily

to be disclosed to the purchaser at the time of sale in accordance

with Section 55(1)(a) of the TP Act. Thus, according to him, it is the

obligation of the seller to hand over possession at the time of sale,

as was stipulated in the Agreement.

22. On the question of whether time is of the essence in such a contract,

it was contended that when a party is not in possession to hand over

the same at the time of execution of an agreement for sale, then

time would not be of the essence as the right to sue would accrue in

favour of the person to whom the suit property is required to be sold

only upon the vendor being in a position to hand over possession of

the property to the buyer. It was further submitted that subsequent

conduct of parties is also relevant for testing whether time is of the

essence of the contract in question. It was submitted that in the

present case, the acceptance of money much after the expiry of the

six-month period by the appellant no.1 from the respondents leaves

no doubt that time was not the essence and the time for performance

of the Agreement would commence only after obtainment of physical

possession by the appellants.

23. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon the decision

of this Court in Godhra Electricity Company Limited v State of 

382 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 199, the relevant paragraphs being 11 to 16;

of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in The Commissioners for

Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Secret Hotels2 Limited

(formerly Med Hotels Limited), [2014] UKSC 16 dated 05.03.2014,

the relevant being paragraph 331, and; The Interpretation of

Contracts, 7th Edition by Sir Kim Lewison, the relevant being

paragraph 3.189.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

24. Having considered the matter, this Court finds that the Judgment

impugned cannot be sustained. The moot question revolves around

whether the Agreement dated 22.11.1990 discloses a fixed timeframe for making payment in full by the respondents that is, in terms

of the recitals in the agreement for sale executed by the appellant

no.1 in favour of the respondents. The admitted position is that the

time indicated in the Agreement was six months from 22.11.1990

i.e., till 21.05.1991 and as per the Legal Notice dated 18.11.1997

sent by the respondents to the appellants, only Rs.7000/- was paid

within the time stipulated. Perusal of the Agreement reveals that the

respondents had agreed to pay the appellants Rs.21,000/- for the

property in question, out of which Rs.3,000/- was already paid as

earnest money and the rest was to be paid within 6 months. The

respondents were to purchase stamp papers at their expense and

the appellants had to register the Sale Deed either in the name of

the respondent no.1 or as proposed by him before the Sub-Registrar

after paying the remaining/balance amount. If the appellants failed

to register the Sale Deed, respondent no.1 had a right to deposit

the balance of sale consideration in the Civil Court and get sale with

possession effected through Court from the first party i.e., appellants

no.1 to 3.

1 ‘33. In English law it is not permissible to take into account the subsequent behaviour or statements of

the parties as an aid to interpreting their written agreement – see FL Schuler AG v Wickman Machine

Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235. The subsequent behaviour or statements of the parties can, however, be

relevant, for a number of other reasons. First, they may be invoked to support the contention that the

written agreement was a sham – ie that it was not in fact intended to govern the parties’ relationship

at all. Secondly, they may be invoked in support of a claim for rectification of the written agreement.

Thirdly, they may be relied on to support a claim that the written agreement was subsequently varied,

or rescinded and replaced by a subsequent contract (agreed by words or conduct). Fourthly, they may

be relied on to establish that the written agreement represented only part of the totality of the parties’

contractual relationship.’

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 383

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

25. At this juncture, the Court would indicate that within six months there

existed the onus of paying the entire balance amount of Rs.18,000/-

by the respondent no.1 to the appellant no.1. It is not the case of the

respondents that they had even offered to pay the remaining/balance

amount before the expiry of the six-month period. Thus, payment

of Rs.3,000/- only out of Rs.21,000/- having been made, or at best

Rs.7,000/- out of Rs.21,000/-, which is the amount indicated in the

Legal Notice sent by the respondents to the appellants, the obvious

import would be that the respondents had not complied with their

obligation under the Agreement within the six-month period.

26. Pausing here, it is notable that the appellant no.1 having accepted

payment of Rs.1,000/- on 21.04.1997 i.e., after appellant no.1 had

executed a Sale Deed in favour of appellant no.7 on 05.11.1997,

coupled with the fact that the forensic expert found the two thumbimpressions purportedly acknowledging payment after the expiry

of the time fixed not matching the fingerprints of appellant no.1 is

clearly indicative that time having not been extended, no enforceable

right accrued to the respondents for getting relief under the 1963

Act. At the highest, if the appellant no.1 had accepted money from

respondent no.1 after the expiry of the time-limit, which itself has not

been conclusively proved during trial or even at the first or second

appellate stages, the remedy available to the defendants was to seek

recovery of such money(ies) paid along with damages or interest to

compensate such loss but a suit for specific performance to execute

the Sale Deed would not be available, in the prevalent facts and

circumstances. In the present case, there is also no explanation,

as to why, an excess amount of Rs.425/-, as claimed, was paid

by respondent no.1 to the appellant no.1, when the respondents’

specific stand is that due to the appellants not being in possession

of the property so as to hand over possession to the respondents,

delay was occasioned. The submission that no adverse effect

could be saddled on the respondents as decree for declaration and

recovery of possession was obtained by appellant no.1 in her favour

only on 27.04.1996 is not acceptable for the reason that there is

no averment that pursuant to such decree, she had also obtained

possession through execution. Thus, the decree dated 27.04.1996

also remained only a decree on paper without actual possession

to appellant no.1. The contention of the respondents becomes 

384 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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self-contradictory especially with regard to cause of action having

arisen after such decree in favour of the appellant no.1 since even

at the time of filing the underlying suit, actual possession not being

with appellant no.1, the Sale Deed could not have been executed.

27. Another important aspect that the Court is expected to consider is

the fact that the appellant no.7 in whose favour there was a Sale

Deed with regard to the suit premises, much prior to issuance of

any Legal Notice and the institution of the suit in question and that

no relief had been sought for cancellation of such Sale Deed, a suit

for specific performance for execution of sale deed qua the very

same property could not be maintained. The matter becomes worse

for the respondents since such relief was also not sought even at

the First Appeal stage nor at the Second Appeal stage, despite the

law permitting and providing for such course of action. Even the

Legal Notice dated 18.11.1997 has been issued after almost seven

months from the alleged last payment of Rs.1.000/-, as claimed by

the respondents to have been made on 21.04.1997.

28. Pertinently, though appellant no.7 was arrayed as a defendant in the

suit, yet no relief seeking cancellation of his Sale Deed was sought for.

29. The ratio laid down in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra) which had a similar

factual matrix squarely applies in the facts and circumstances of the

present case, on the issue that time was the essence of contract and

even if time is not the essence of the agreement, in the event that

there is no reference of any existence of any tenant in the building

and it is mentioned that within a period of six months, the plaintiffs

should purchase the stamp paper and pay the balance consideration

whereupon the defendants will execute the Sale Deed, there is not

a single letter or notice from the plaintiffs to the defendants calling

upon them to the tenant to vacate and get the Sale Deed executed

within time. Further, the Legal Notice was issued after two and a half

years from expiry of the time period in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra),

whereas in the present case, the Legal Notice has been issued after

more than six and a half years. The relevant paragraphs from K.S.

Vidyanadam (supra) read as under:

‘10.It has been consistently held by the courts in India,

following certain early English decisions, that in the case

of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time

is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 385

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed

by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From

these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and

every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which

does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of

the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within

the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits

stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing

by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that

the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement

have no significance or value and that they mean nothing.

Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not

made the essence of the contract, the time-limit(s) specified

in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored

with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion

vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held

by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v.

Kamal Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519]: (SCC p. 528, para 25)

“… it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable

property there is no presumption as to time being

the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the

essence of the contract, the Court may infer that it is

to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions

are (evident?): (1) from the express terms of the

contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3)

from the surrounding circumstances, for example,

the object of making the contract.”

In other words, the court should look at all the relevant

circumstances including the time-limit(s) specified in the

agreement and determine whether its discretion to grant

specific performance should be exercised. Now in the

case of urban properties in India, it is well-known that

their prices have been going up sharply over the last few

decades — particularly after 1973 [ It is a well-known fact

that the steep rise in the price of oil following the 1973

Arab-Israeli war set in inflationary trends all over the world.

Particularly affected were countries like who import bulk

of their requirement of oil.]. In this case, the suit property

is the house property situated in Madurai, which is one of 

386 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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the major cities of Tamil Nadu. The suit agreement was

in December 1978 and the six months’ period specified

therein for completing the sale expired with 15-6-1979. The

suit notice was issued by the plaintiff only on 11-7-1981,

i.e., more than two years after the expiry of six months’

period. The question is what was the plaintiff doing in this

interval of more than two years? The plaintiff says that he

has been calling upon Defendants 1 to 3 to get the tenant

vacated and execute the sale deed and that the defendants

were postponing the same representing that the tenant

is not vacating the building. The defendants have denied

this story. According to them, the plaintiff never moved

in the matter and never called upon them to execute the

sale deed. The trial court has accepted the defendants’

story whereas the High Court has accepted the plaintiff’s

story. Let us first consider whose story is more probable

and acceptable. For this purpose, we may first turn to the

terms of the agreement. In the agreement of sale, there is

no reference to the existence of any tenant in the building.

What it says is that within the period of six months, the

plaintiff should purchase the stamp papers and pay the

balance consideration whereupon the defendants will

execute the sale deed and that prior to the registration

of the sale deed, the defendants shall vacate and deliver

possession of the suit house to the plaintiff. There is not

a single letter or notice from the plaintiff to the defendants

calling upon them to get the tenant vacated and get the

sale deed executed until he issued the suit notice on 11-7-

1981. It is not the plaintiff’s case that within six months’, he

purchased the stamp papers and offered to pay the balance

consideration. The defendants’ case is that the tenant is

their own relation, that he is ready to vacate at any point

of time and that the very fact that the plaintiff has in his

suit notice offered to purchase the house with the tenant

itself shows that the story put forward by him is false. The

tenant has been examined by the defendant as DW 2. He

stated that soon after the agreement, he was searching

for a house but could not secure one. Meanwhile (i.e.,

on the expiry of six months from the date of agreement), 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 387

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

he stated, the defendants told him that since the plaintiff

has abandoned the agreement, he need not vacate. It is

equally an admitted fact that between 15-12-1978 and 11-

7-1981, the plaintiff has purchased two other properties.

The defendants’ consistent refrain has been that the prices

of house properties in Madurai have been rising fast, that

within the said interval of 2 1/2 years, the prices went up

three times and that only because of the said circumstance

has the plaintiff (who had earlier abandoned any idea of

going forward with the purchase of the suit property) turned

round and demanded specific performance. Having regard

to the above circumstances and the oral evidence of the

parties, we are inclined to accept the case put forward

by Defendants 1 to 3. We reject the story put forward by

the plaintiff that during the said period of 2 1/2 years, he

has been repeatedly asking the defendants to get the

tenant vacated and execute the sale deed and that they

were asking for time on the ground that tenant was not

vacating. The above finding means that from 15-12-1978

till 11-7-1981, i.e., for a period of more than 2 1/2 years,

the plaintiff was sitting quiet without taking any steps to

perform his part of the contract under the agreement

though the agreement specified a period of six months

within which he was expected to purchase stamp papers,

tender the balance amount and call upon the defendants

to execute the sale deed and deliver possession of the

property. We are inclined to accept the defendants’ case

that the values of the house property in Madurai town were

rising fast and this must have induced the plaintiff to wake

up after 2 1/2 years and demand specific performance.

11. Shri Sivasubramaniam cited the decision of the

Madras High Court in S.V. Sankaralinga Nadar v. P.T.S.

Ratnaswami Nadar [AIR 1952 Mad 389 : (1952) 1 MLJ 44]

holding that mere rise in prices is no ground for denying

the specific performance. With great respect, we are

unable to agree if the said decision is understood as saying

that the said factor is not at all to be taken into account

while exercising the discretion vested in the court by law.

We cannot be oblivious to the reality — and the reality 

388 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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is constant and continuous rise in the values of urban

properties — fuelled by large-scale migration of people

from rural areas to urban centres and by inflation. Take

this very case. The plaintiff had agreed to pay the balance

consideration, purchase the stamp papers and ask for the

execution of sale deed and delivery of possession within

six months. He did nothing of the sort. The agreement

expressly provides that if the plaintiff fails in performing his

part of the contract, the defendants are entitled to forfeit

the earnest money of Rs 5000 and that if the defendants

fail to perform their part of the contract, they are liable

to pay double the said amount. Except paying the small

amount of Rs 5000 (as against the total consideration

of Rs 60,000) the plaintiff did nothing until he issued the

suit notice 2 1/2 years after the agreement. Indeed, we

are inclined to think that the rigor of the rule evolved by

courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the

case of immovable properties — evolved in times when

prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown

— requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in

the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time,

we do so. The learned counsel for the plaintiff says that

when the parties entered into the contract, they knew that

prices are rising; hence, he says, rise in prices cannot

be a ground for denying specific performance. May be,

the parties knew of the said circumstance but they have

also specified six months as the period within which the

transaction should be completed. The said time-limit may

not amount to making time the essence of the contract

but it must yet have some meaning. Not for nothing could

such time-limit would have been prescribed. Can it be

stated as a rule of law or rule of prudence that where time

is not made the essence of the contract, all stipulations

of time provided in the contract have no significance or

meaning or that they are as good as non-existent? All this

only means that while exercising its discretion, the court

should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe

certain time-limit(s) for taking steps by one or the other

party, it must have some significance and that the said 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 389

Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.

time-limit(s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground

that time has not been made the essence of the contract

(relating to immovable properties).

xxx

13. In the case before us, it is not mere delay. It is a case

of total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for 2 1/2 years

in clear violation of the terms of agreement which required

him to pay the balance, purchase the stamp papers and

then ask for execution of sale deed within six months.

Further, the delay is coupled with substantial rise in prices

— according to the defendants, three times — between the

date of agreement and the date of suit notice. The delay

has brought about a situation where it would be inequitable

to give the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.’

(Emphasis supplied)

30. The decisions relied upon by the respondents, relating to the conduct

of parties are of no avail to them in the circumstances, as even if

the case of later payments by the respondents to the appellants

is accepted, the same being at great intervals and there being no

willingness shown by them to pay the remaining amount or getting

the Sale Deed ascribed on necessary stamp paper and giving notice

to the appellants to execute the Sale Deed, it cannot be said that

in the present case, judged on the anvil of the conduct of parties,

especially the appellants, time would not remain the essence of the

contract.

31. For reasons afore-noted, the Impugned Judgment of the High Court

as also the judgment of the First Appellate Court stand set aside.

The judgment/order of the Trial Court is revived and restored.

32. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

33. In the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs is proposed.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeal allowed.